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The Revolution Was Not in Accounting

by JOHN R. PALMER/Research Associate, National Association of Accountants
In this bicentennial year, volumes
seem to have been written about all
aspects of life in colonial America
except one—its accounting. The
reason may be that no new developments in the art of accounting took
place in America 200 years ago to
interest historians.
But the fact is that even if colonial
America had little influence on
accounting, accounting was an
important factor in the life of the
eighteenth century. Fortunately, the
account books of colonial American
businessmen, ranging from its rich
and powerful citizens to obscure
country merchants, still exist and
provide a clear insight into the

commerce and life styles of the
period.
The accounts of Ben Franklin's
print shop—and the audit done
prior to its sale by the first recorded
American "public accountant"—
have been preserved. The
meticulous and voluminous
accounts of George Washington's
expenses, not only as commanderin-chief of the Continental Army but
also as a leading planter, land
speculator, and businessman, reveal
new insights about the "father of
our country."
As an impoverished American
government conducted an
expensive war against the leading

superpower of the eighteenth
century, accounting records show
behind-the-scenes problems never
mentioned in chronicles of battles
and troop movements. O n e of the
great leaders of the Revolution was
Robert Morris, a Philadelphia
merchant and financier who never
fought in a battle but who handled
the accounts that financed the
rations, uniforms, and weapons of
victory.
O n the technical side, colonial
accounting bore many similarities to
modern accounting, but more
interesting are the differences. The
two best-known and most widely
used accounting documents today
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are the balance sheet and income
statement. Neither of these forms
existed in colonial America or
anywhere else in the eighteenth
century.
Essentially, the corporation as a
business form did not exist under
British rule between 1719 and 1825—
a result of the "Bubble Act" passed
by the parliament requiring personal
approval by the king of any such
venture. Owning a colonial business
required either an independent
entrepreneur or a partnership. Thus
the public reporting of modern
corporations was totally unknown.
Nor were taxes levied on sales or
earnings of businesses, which meant
today's reporting requirements to
the government were also
unknown. As a result, the books that
were kept in colonial America
existed solely to aid the owner in
the conduct of his business.
The three principal books kept by
colonial businessmen were the
waste book, the journal, and the
ledger. Original entries were placed
roughly but in detail in the waste
book by the merchant's servant,
wife, or whoever made the
transaction. These entries were then
repeated in the journal, separating
the debits from the credits. This was
written in the "fine hand" of the
merchant. Finally, journal entries
were written up in individual
accounts in the ledger. As debts
were paid, they were lightly crossed
out in the ledger, and the date of
payment was added.
Subsidiary books were also kept
to record cash transactions,
expenditures, hours worked, and
other accounts appropriate to a
particular business. These books
were posted directly to the ledger.
No "generally accepted accounting
principles" existed. Since the
books were kept solely for the
convenience of the owner/manager,
they were unaudited.
Periodicity did not exist. The most
common reasons for balancing an
account were the completion of a
ledger book, death of the merchant,
or sale of the business. Errors were
commonplace and seldom
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were corrected.
The essence of business 200 years
ago was barter and credit, according
to account books of the time. Barter
was used because of a shortage of
money in the colonies. By British
regulation, no coins could be
minted in America, and by policy
the balance of trade was always in
favor of England, causing an outflow
of whatever money there was.
Barter was convenient in small
rural communities where people's
needs complemented one another.
But it was also appropriate for the
large cities, since merchants could
know their customers in a colonial
Philadelphia which had but 40,000
residents, or a New York, which had
20,000.
Barter did not usually take the
form of simultaneous swapping.
Instead, it was "bookkeeping
barter," where the first half of a
transaction created a debit on the
books of the recipient and a credit
on the books of the giver, it would
be paid later by receiving goods
directly, since the accounts were a
jumble of goods and services on
both sides. Small farmers and
tradesmen, whose modern-day
counterparts have no knowledge of
accounting, thus needed to have
some inkling of double-entry
bookkeeping in order to participate
in the colonial business system.
Naturally, this bookkeeping barter
facilitated credit transfers between
individuals, so that notes payable to
order became a private type of
paper money.
In addition to such private paper
money, a mass of public paper
money was issued by each state as
well as under federal auspices. This
money was printed originally
because of the shortage of specie, or
hard money, but its supply increased
rapidly when it became necessary to
finance a major war. This currency
was "soft" in that it was not backed
by precious metal. The term "not
worth a Continental" resulted from
the inflation and consequent
depreciation of the value of this
currency.
Despite the inflation, the income

of the federal government for the
war year 1781 came to a little over $1
million, according to a 1795 report
of the Continental Congress.
The following shows receipts and
disbursements:
RECEIPTS
Bills of exchange sold . . . $ 294,165
Specie from France
462,597
Paper money negotiations
62,001
Yorktown booty
71,439
Specific supplies of
Pennsylvania
101,054
Prizes
34,717
Sundries
4,106
Total
$1,030,079
EXPENDITURES
Salaries and expenses
of civil officers
% 15,302
Marine
87,608
Paymaster
140,965
Military and ordnance
stores
39,573
Quartermaster general...
110,330
Army subsistence
114,997
Army clothing
60,560
Medical department
10,090
Payment of old accounts.
115,196
Miscellaneous
28,838
Total

$ 723,459

Surplus

$ 306,620

The surplus shown is doubtless
not a real picture of the financial
state of the US Treasury at the time;
one source suggests the surplus was
"created" to enhance the
possibilities of further borrowing
from Europe. From most accounts,
the government was operating far in
the red—up to $20 million in
expenses—while running the
printing presses to try to stay even.
The galloping inflation created by
this "soft" Continental currency was
seized by the British as a weapon of
war, since a defeat of American
finances would have ended the
revolution. England printed and
circulated large quantities of
counterfeit US currency to further
erode its purchasing power. But
these efforts were partially offset by
infusions of specie from America's

allies—France, Spain, and Holland.
One interesting problem faced by
the financial records of the time is
the intermixing of this Continental
"soft" currency with the hard specie
loaned by France. Considering that
at one point in 1780 a dollar in silver
equaled as much as $500 in Continental currency, the inadequacy of
colonial accounting being able to
cope with such a situation is
apparent.
Investments in privateering or a
rum-running voyage helped to
make venture accounting the rule
of the day for revolutionary
businessmen. The privateer would
capture a British ship and share its
bounty with the government. Each
individual venture had different
partners who invested their money
to equip and launch a warship.
Account books of these ventures
exist, showing the costs of outfitting
a cruiser in hopes of capturing, say,
a rich English merchantman
returning from India. These
endeavors were called patriotic
piracy by many, although it would
appear in some cases that the piracy
aspect was paramount. The British
navy referred to Captain John Paul
Jones as a pirate and would have
hanged him if they had caught him.
Periodic results were unimportant
in such ventures, since the
partnership was dissolved after the

voyage, and the assets which
remained were divided and shared
by the participants.
Since there were no American
stock companies, partnerships were
sometimes spread rather thin. The
broadest on record is 1/96 of a
trading voyage. Risks were high on
such ventures, but rewards were
often good. A partnership, Jack and
Bromfield of Newburyport, Mass.,
cleared £7,591 profit on the slender
trading capital of £1,600 between
1766 and 1774.
The accounting and finances of
the Continental army in 1776 caused
major problems that grew steadily
worse as the war wore on. At times
they frequently caused more
headaches than did the "redcoats,"
The underlying difficulty was that a
small fledgling government, lacking
the full support of its populace,
could not afford to staff, arm,
clothe, and feed a large standing
army. The Continental Congress
simply had no luck in taxing citizens
to pay for the war. The situation was
aggravated, moreover, by the
inclination of many of the people
who supplied these needs to be
motivated solely by profit rather
than by patriotic motives.
The difficulty of keeping
accounting records may be suggested by the following:
Compiling a company roster in

the Continental Army was
compounded by its recruiting
methods. The army was staffed in
part by means of paying bounties, or
bonuses, for enlistment. This created
a class of individuals who would
enlist, desert, and enlist again in
order to collect a number of
bonuses. (It was also difficult to
keep track of an army, whose men
would leave for home to tend to
their plowing or planting.)
Arms were as difficult to inventory
as to obtain. They usually consisted
of whatever the volunteers could
bring with them, supplemented by
some French muskets. It was not
uncommon for 20 per cent of the
Continental soldiers entering a
battle to have no firearms. They
would pick them up from fallen
comrades, or from the enemy.
Uniforms for the common soldiers
required no records at first, since
they did not exist. Nor were they
ever in reasonable supply, as they
progressed from the rags at Valley
Forge, where men could not drill
because they had no clothes to
wear, to a large shipload of uniforms
that arrived from Europe a year after
the war ended.
Food for colonial troops ranged
from insufficient to non-existent,
due to a general shortage and high
prices. These problems were caused
by such factors as farmers having to
serve in the army, sales by American
farmers to the English army for gold,
sales abroad to raise money, lack of
patriotism by some loyalist farmers,
and a distribution system that was
highly inefficient and included some
corrupt commissary officers. The
latter facts are perhaps shown by the
saying at Valley Forge that wood for
huts and fires was the only supply
that was plentiful, because it was the
one not involving the commissary or
quartermaster corps.
The commissary general's
department was created by a
Congressional bill of 41 sections and
6,000 words. It covered duplicate
invoices, receipts, issuance slips,
ten-column ledgers, and so on. The
accounting system created a series
of cross-checks on commissaries of

21

forage, commissaries of purchase,
issuing commissaries, keepers of
stores warehouses, line officers
receiving provisions from the
commissaries, and the war board.
The organization and penalties
provided by this bill probably
prevented some theft and
profiteering, but it left the army
ill-fed and ill-equipped.
The financial administration of the
revolution continued to decline
until 1780, when Congress basically
declared itseif bankrupt. That is
when 1,500 Continental troops
rebelled for fair pay, because
inflation had brought four months
of a soldier's pay to equal the price
of one bushel of wheat. Congress
voted to give full monetary authority
to the financier Robert Morris. He
took control in 1781 at a time that
American bills of credit no longer
had any value, taxes had proven to
be uncollectible, and the conduct of
the war was costing $20 million per
year, almost all of which was paid in
printing press or fiat money.
Morris saved a failing situation. By
administrative cutting, he reduced
the war expense to $5 million. He
negotiated new loans from France,
Spain, and Holland, taking payment
in silver coins through Cuba and
Mexico to revive the weak US
currency. He drew new bills of
credit against European loans that
were under negotiation, using his
own financial prestige and
reputation to get them accepted,
and pressuring Ben Franklin in Paris
to get France to cover them.
The first American bank was
founded by Robert Morris in
Philadelphia to aid the revolutionary
effort. It took in Continental or state
paper from the subscribers, who got
six-month interest-bearing notes on
the bank. Military supplies were
bought with this currency. Bills
drawn on the envoys to Europe
were held as collateral security until
Congress paid for the supplies.
Although these bills were in
negotiable form, they were not
negotiated until the envoys abroad
had actually completed the loans.
The final American campaign of
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the Revolution at Yorktown,
Virginia, which defeated the British
army under Cornwallis and ended
the war, was financed by a $1.4
million note Morris issued in his
own name, plus $20,000 of his own
funds in silver coins used to provide
back pay to soldiers.
Despite his major part in winning
the Revolution, Robert Morris
remains a controversial figure in
American history. Evidence exists
that he used his position to make
private profit as a merchant and land
speculator, and that his wealth
increased dramatically during the
war, because of his misuse of power
and influence. After the Revolution,
however, huge unsuccessful land
speculations brought Morris to ruin
and debtors' prison.
This entire military effort was, of
course, under the direction of
George Washington. A new side of
his character is revealed by the
account books he kept, both as a
military man and as a leading
businessman of his time.
As early as 1761, Washington
shipped 56,000 pounds of tobacco to
England and stored another 8,300
pounds of that year's crop. Two
years later, he organized the
Mississippi Company to acquire 1
million acres of western land,
writing the articles of incorporation

himself and selling stock to friends.
The British Crown refused, however,
to give him a grant. Later
Washington switched from raising
tobacco to raising wheat and
became the largest American miller
of flour. He also raised prize
livestock and conducted a major
fishing business.
George Washington, like other
colonial businessmen, kept his own
accounts throughout his life. He
devised his own filing system, using
a letter press, and he filled three
large ledgers in his own hand. His
books were ruled like a cash book
with debits to the left and credits to
the right. The system was
presumably based on an accounting
textbook Washington had in his
private library, Bookkeeping
Modernized, or
Merchant-Accounts
by Double Entry according to the
Italian Form, by John Mair of
Scotland, published in 1769.
The profits and net worth in
Washington's accounts are not easily
calculated. It appears that he sold
about $400,000 worth of land
between 1775 and 1783, but with the
various forms of depreciated money
then in circulation, this figure has
little meaning in terms of the specie
of that time, or translated into a
modern currency value. Washington
apparently was also frustrated by
being unable to strike a meaningful
balance, but he made a few
attempts. In 1769, he achieved some
type of balance showing: "By cash
lost, stolen, or paid away without
charging—£143-15-2."
He kept exact books on his several
farms. They covered acres planted
and harvested and the value of
crops produced. Even during the
revolution, he secured continual
reports from his nephew on the
progress at Mount Vernon, and sent
him back instructions and advice.
The results of his farming were not
always so impressive; he appears to
have been able to earn only about
$15,000 per year from Mount
Vernon, a plantation then worth
about $200,000, or a return of 7Vi
percent untaxed.
Washington was very conscious of

inflation and made notes in his
accounts, giving approximate values
of dollars at different times in the
inflation spiral. He had lost through
currency depreciation much of the
fortune that his wife Martha had
brought him from her first husband.
In later years, he wrote letters
cautioning his stepson to protect his
property against inflation.
In his military life, George
Washington also kept careful
accounts. Congress had offered him
$500 per month salary in 1775 as
commander-in-chief of the
Continental army, but he refused
any salary and asked only for the
reimbursement of his expenses.
The expense account was kept in
the form of a ledger, using doubleentry, with all expenses dated,
briefly explained, and stated in both
the dollar amount spent and in a
British pounds sterling equivalent
(listed under "lawful"}. This account

book traces the entire history of the
American Revolution as it follows
Washington's travels and expenses
from the first skirmish at Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to the final victory at
Yorktown, Virginia.
Washington's expense account is
interesting not only for its historical
content, but also for the great care
and precision shown in the keeping
of the accounts. The magnitude of
the accounts is also worthy of note
because the total expenses came to
$449,261.51 in today's terms
(allowing $26 in 1975 currency as
conservatively equal to one British
pound sterling in 1780).
The accounts of Washington—
along with those of Jefferson,
Hancock, Franklin, and Morris—
provide seldom revealed insights
into the lives of our revolutionary
leaders. They become normal men
with problems, rather than the
monuments that such heroes tend

to become with the passage of time.
Through such accounts the
American Revolution, too, takes on
a new aspect—not only that of a
cumulative series of heroic battles,
but also of an unrelenting struggle
to finance soldiers, arms, uniforms,
and rations.
The life of the average colonial
businessman or farmer also is
another area that is given focus
when considered from an
accounting aspect. Inflation,
currency shortages, debts, barter,
and joint ventures were all recorded
for posterity in their ledgers and
journals.
Perhaps some day historians with
a knowledge of and interest in
accounting will unlock new areas of
study now being overlooked. In the
meantime, accounting in colonial
America waits to be discovered.
When the day comes, will it change
our understanding of the past?
O
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